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Two methods of addressing consumer concerns regarding the use of genetically 
modified foods are evaluated using conjoint analysis – the use of a familiar brand 
and government certification. In one survey, consumers were asked to rate 
hypothetical products based on brand, price, and production technology attributes. 
In a second survey, consumers rated hypothetical products that included 
government certification, price, and production technology attributes. Both the 
individual and aggregate results indicate that government certification would be 
more effective at assuaging consumers concerns than would the use of a familiar 
brand, although a familiar brand was sufficient to address consumer concerns for a 
significant number of respondents. The analysis also indicated that different factors 
are associated with strong consumer preferences for a familiar brand and 
government certification. 
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Introduction 
 
The introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), that is organisms with 
DNA from foreign organisms, has been received with mixed reaction by consumers. 
Nonetheless, in the U.S., farmers have increasingly adopted genetically modified 
(GM) varieties. In 2003, plantings of GM corn, soybeans, and upland cotton are 
estimated to represent 38%, 80%, and 70% of acres planted (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2003), respectively, up from 
25%, 52%, and 56% in 2000 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, 2000). GM food products have, for the most part, received little 
attention from the media and consumer groups in the U.S. The introduction of bST 
and the inadvertent use of the GM StarLink corn in Taco Shells are two notable 
exceptions. On the other hand, some U.S. companies have fueled the debate by 
advertising that they will not use GM food ingredients. Gerber puts “NO GMO’s” 
labels on its baby food, whereas Ben and Jerry’s products include the statement 
“The family farmers who supply our milk and cream pledge not to treat their cows 
with rBGH.” 
 
The reaction in Europe has been much more severe. In the U.K., two of the three 
major supermarkets have bowed to consumer pressure and promised that their 
house-brand meat and dairy products will be produced from animals that will not 
receive GM feed (Moore). Furthermore, the European Union had imposed a 
moratorium on the introduction of new GM crops since 1999. In April, 2004, a law 
passed by the European Parliament required that food products with GM content of 
greater than 0.9% include the label “This product contains genetically modified 
organisms.” 
 
Food Quality Attributes 
 
In considering how to convey product attribute information to consumers, it is 
important to distinguish between the different types of attributes. Nelson classified 
attributes as either search or experience. Search attributes are those characteristics 
whose qualities can be discovered during the search process, prior to the purchase of 
a good. On the other hand, experience attributes may only be determined after 
purchasing the product. Using fresh apples as an example, color and external 
blemishes would be search attributes, whereas flavor and sweetness would be 
experience attributes. Darby and Karni identified a third category of attributes, 
which they call credence attributes. They define credence attributes as “those 
which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use.” Credence 
attributes are not easily discovered by consumers or are discovered only at great 
cost. Caswell argues that food safety and food process qualities are credence 
attributes because consumers cannot reliably determine the process used, nor 
evaluate its quality. Likewise, nutrition is a credence attribute (Caswell and 
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The production of foods using biotechnology, or GMOs, is considered a credence 
attribute because in most cases consumers cannot easily ascertain the process by 
which the food is produced. While there may be some noteworthy exceptions, as 
would be the case if a GMO yielded a product with a distinct color or shape, in most 
cases the production process is not detectable by consumers or is detectable only 
with considerable effort or expense. 
 
Private markets for quality attributes often perform inefficiently because of 
“imperfect information, transaction costs in acquiring and using information, and 
externalities” causing policy makers to search out remedies (Caswell and 
Mojduszka). Such remedies include mandatory disclosure of information, controls 
regulating voluntary information claims, providing public information, subsidies for 
providing information (Caswell and Mojduszka), published guidelines indicating the 
types of acceptable claims, and a prohibition against deceptive claims (Caswell). 
 
The roles of government and private firms in providing information to consumers on 
food quality credence attributes are not well defined. Government often assumes a 
role in the provision of information, perhaps because it is perceived as a reputable 




A number of U.S. studies have examined consumer response to GM foods and 
generally concluded that there is limited resistance to such foods. Baker and 
Burnham concluded that, given detailed information on the production technology, 
up to one-third of U.S. consumers may base their purchase decision on the GM 
content of food. The International Food Information Council Foundation, which has 
tracked U.S. consumer opinion on biotechnology since 1997, has found that public 
opinion has remained fairly stable with a small majority of consumers indicating 
that they would be likely to purchase produce that has been modified using 
biotechnology to make the food taste better or fresher (IFIC).  
 
Several studies have assessed the response of consumers outside of the US to GM 
foods and have generally found that these consumers have a much greater aversion 
to GMOs than do U.S. consumers. McCluskey, et al. reported that Japanese 
consumers required discounts of at least 50% in order to purchase GM noodles and 
tofu. Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux found in a study of French consumers that 
providing information that a food was genetically modified decreased willingness to 
pay by approximately 20%.  
 
Prior research yields some insight into consumer valuation of various labeling 
schemes as they relate to the use of biotechnology. Huffman et al. evaluated the use 
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voluntary labeling would be more efficient because it is less expensive but still gives 
consumers the information they need to choose between GM and non-GM foods. In a 
study of French, German, and British consumers, Roosen, Lusk, and Fox evaluate 
the use of private brands, labels of origin, and mandatory labeling of beef from 
cattle fed GM crops. They found that consumers in all three countries placed 
greater importance on labels of origin than brands and that the importance of both 
brands and labels of origin increased with consumer concern for production 
technologies. The vast majority of consumers in France, Germany, and the U.K. 
desired mandatory labeling of cattle fed GM crops (95%, 93%, and 83%, 
respectively). In surveys of Utah and U.K consumers, Christensen found that in the 
U.S., federal and state governments were the most trusted groups for certifying food 
safety. Conversely, consumers in the U.K. generally had lower confidence in the 
government to ensure food safety and placed greater trust in private organizations 




The results of previous research indicate that there is some level of resistance to 
GM foods in the U.S. and that most U.S. consumers would benefit from being 
provided information regarding whether the foods they consume are the products of 
genetic engineering. However, it is not clear that U.S. consumers are willing to pay 
much for information relating to how their foods are produced. Furthermore, it is 
not clear which type of organization is best positioned to provide such information. 
Previous research has examined consumer preferences for labeling of GM content 
and the level of trust in various types of agencies. The motivation for this study is to 
explore the effectiveness of private brands and government certification in 
assuaging consumers’ concerns regarding the safety of GM foods. Specifically, the 
objectives of this research are to examine the extent to which a familiar brand and 
government certification may lessen consumer concern over the safety of a GM food. 
Factors that influence consumers’ preferences for branding and government 
certification are also explored. This information will be useful to food companies in 
determining whether consumer trust in their brands is sufficient to offset concerns 
related to GM technology. Likewise, policymakers may use the results of this study 
to determine whether the certification of the safety of GM foods is a role best 
fulfilled by the government. 
 
In the following section, the application of conjoint analysis to the research problem 
is discussed. This is followed by the development of the specific model used in the 
research in the section entitled Theoretical and Empirical Models. The Procedures 
section contains detailed information on the implementation of the survey that was 
used to collect the data. Finally, the results of the analysis are presented in the 
Results section and discussed in the Conclusions and Implications section. 
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Methods 
 
Stated preference methods have been widely applied to problems of consumer choice 
when revealed preference data are not easily obtained. Stated preference methods 
have been used for evaluating hypothetical products, hypothetical product 
characteristics, products for which no market exists, or proposed policies that may 
result in new products or product characteristics. In this paper, conjoint analysis, 
one of many stated preference methods, is used to elicit consumer preferences for 
the two means of addressing consumer concerns regarding GM food products 
identified in the previous section.  
 
Conjoint analysis (CA) has been used to evaluate a wide range of hypothetical 
products and product characteristics (Hair et al.) including food products such as 
apples (Baker), corn flakes (Baker and Burnham), and salmon (Anderson and 
Bettencourt). CA is frequently used to model consumer choice because it allows 
researchers to realistically assess consumer response to new products and new 
product characteristics without the expense and time involved in product 
development and test marketing. Several disadvantages of the CA method should 
also be noted. They include the possibility of hypothetical bias, respondent ratings 
that vary with the measure of respondent preference (rating, ranking, or discrete 
choice), and inconsistent respondent ratings across product profiles.  
 
CA surveys are typically designed so that subjects are presented with realistic 
product choices, similar to what they would experience in a retail shopping 
environment. Subjects are asked to express their preferences for these hypothetical 
products, represented by bundles of attributes, by rating or ranking them. Multiple 
observations for each subject permit the estimation of a utility function for each 
individual and an estimate of how each attribute is valued.  
 
In this research, we chose a simple and straightforward design involving two 
surveys designed to independently assess the effectiveness of marketing GM food 
products under a familiar brand and with government certification. Our purpose 
was to minimize the possibility of respondent confusion by constructing separate 
surveys for the brand and certification questions and limiting the number of 
attributes and attribute levels.  
 
In the first survey, consumers were presented with hypothetical banana products 
that included a GM alternative sold either as an unbranded product or marketed 
under a familiar brand name. In the second survey, unbranded hypothetical banana 
products were presented that included either government safety certification or no 
safety certification. Bananas were chosen as the product because they met two 
criteria, consumer familiarity with the product and the presence of a familiar brand. 
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marketed in the U.S. at the time of the survey and there had been very little 
discussion in the media of GM bananas. 
 
Hypothetical products are developed by choosing product attributes and attribute 
levels so that the hypothetical products are realistically and fully described. 
However, the desire for realism must be tempered by the need to keep the number 
of products (combinations of attributes and attribute levels), which subjects must 
evaluate, to a manageable number. This is typically accomplished by omitting 
attributes that are unimportant to consumers and holding constant other 
attributes. Because we conducted separate surveys for the brand and certification 
attributes and limited the number of attributes and attribute levels, we were able to 
use a full factorial design could in both surveys. The most important product 
attributes were determined by surveying a small sample of 20 consumers in 
September 2001. The most frequently mentioned observable attributes for bananas 
included, color, brand, size, and price.  
 
In the first survey (brand survey) three attributes were chosen to describe the 
hypothetical banana products: brand, a variable representing the production 
technology, and price. The attributes were chosen to address the underlying 
research question, that is, to permit the analysis of the tradeoffs consumers make 
among the choice of brand, production technology, and price. The color and size 
attributes were held constant; all banana products were described as yellow, firm, 
and of medium size.  
 
The objective of the second survey (certification survey) was to evaluate the extent 
to which government certification might assuage consumers’ GMO fears. Again, 
three attributes were chosen to describe the hypothetical banana products. Like the 
first experiment, production technology and price attributes were specified, but a 
certification attribute was substituted for the brand attribute. Because brand was 
not included in the second version of the survey, it was necessary to hold brand 
constant. All banana products were described as unbranded, yellow, firm, and of 
medium size.  
 
Two attribute levels were selected for each attribute. For the brand attribute, the 
bananas were described as either “unbranded,” indicating that they were grown by 
an unidentified grower or “Chiquita brand,” indicating that they were grown by 
Chiquita. To determine the price levels, an informal survey of banana prices at 
several supermarket chains around the U.S. was conducted in October, 2001. Based 
on the results of the survey, price levels of $0.39 and $0.59 per pound were 
established, representing the low and high ends of the price range at the time of the 
survey. The great majority of non-sale prices for bananas fell within this price 
range. Because most previous research has indicated that consumers were willing to 
pay only relatively small price premiums for attributes such as labeling or 
certification, a spread of approximately $0.20 (a margin of approximately 50 percent G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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over the lower price) was deemed sufficient, given the other variables in the models. 
For the production technology attribute, the bananas were described as either 
“conventionally produced” or “genetically engineered.” Conventionally produced 
bananas were described as developed using traditional breeding techniques. 
Genetically engineered bananas were described as developed using modern 
biotechnology techniques (commonly used to alter specific genes in order to increase 
production, provide disease resistance, or enhance nutritional value). The two levels 
for the certification attribute were “no certification” and “FDA certified.” No 
certification was described as not including a label and indicating that no special 
testing had been conducted to ensure that the product was safe for human 
consumption. FDA certified was described as being labeled “FDA Certified,” and 
indicating that the product had undergone special testing by the Food and Drug 
Administration to ensure that it was safe for human consumption. The term 
“special testing” was used to indicate that additional testing was conducted to 
ensure that the GM food was safe. This could be an important distinction for 
consumers who are aware that all food products approved by the FDA are 
considered safe. 
 
The possibility of interaction effects between the attributes was explored by 
conducting a pilot survey with a small sample of 25 people in October, 2001. For 
each pair of attributes, respondents were asked to rate their preference for each 
level of one attribute at each level of a second attribute. Strong interaction is 
indicated when the rank order of the ratings for one attribute varies with the level 
of a second attribute. No interaction effects were evident among the attributes in 
this study. 
 
A full factorial design was used resulting in 8 hypothetical products. The survey 
was designed and subsequently pretested in October, 2001 using a group of 10 
people to ensure that the instructions were clear and the survey was easy to 
complete. A follow up discussion with the group resulted in several improvements to 
the survey. 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Models 
 
Random utility theory provides the basis for modeling consumer choices. Consumers 
are assumed to maximize utility as expressed in the following equation:  
 
(1) Uij = Vij + εij 
 
where Uij represents the utility of the ith individual for the jth alternative. Utility is 
partitioned into two components, a systematic component Vij that is a function of 
product attributes and sociodemographic characteristics, and a random component 
εij. (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait).  
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Vij may be expanded as follows: 
 






where aijk represents the kth attribute for the ith individual for the jth alternative 
and the ßs are corresponding utility parameters that may vary with individual 
sociodemographic characteristics.  
  
The empirical consumer choice models for the two experiments described in the 
previous section follow from equation (2). The brand model is specified as: 
 
(3) Pi = ßi1 + ßi2BRAND + ßi3PRICE + ßi4TECHNOLOGY + εi, for i = 1, …, I, 
 
where Pi  is the preference rating for the ith individual (scale of 1 to 10, with 10 
being most preferred), BRAND, is a binary variable indicating whether the product 
was branded or not (1 if Chiquita brand, 0 if unbranded), PRICE is the price per 
pound (either $0.39 or $0.59), and TECHNOLOGY is a binary variable representing 
the production technology (1 if genetically engineered, 0 if conventionally produced). 
 
The empirical model for the certification model is specified as: 
 
(4) Pi = ßi1 + ßi2CERTIFICATION + ßi3PRICE + ßi4TECHNOLOGY + εi, for i = 1, …, I, 
 
where CERTIFICATION is a binary variable indicating whether the product was 




Two surveys were constructed as described in the Methods section. In both cases, 
the eight hypothetical products consisted of three attributes each with two attribute 
levels. Survey recipients, who received only one of the two surveys, were instructed 
to rate each of the banana products on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 representing the 
most preferred and 1 representing the least preferred alternative. The bananas 
were described as being either yellow, firm and of medium size (brand survey) or as 
unbranded, yellow, firm and of medium size (certification survey). Each of the eight 
alternative hypothetical products was described, using the attribute levels as 
descriptors, with a space provided for the respondent’s rating. The survey also 
included questions regarding sociodemographic characteristics, knowledge of 
biotechnology, risk averseness, trust in government and private companies, and 
new product adoption.  
 
The survey was mailed with a letter that encouraged the recipient’s participation in 
the study and provided instructions for completing the survey. A postage-paid G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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return envelope was also provided. A follow-up post card was mailed after 
approximately one month to encourage non-respondents to complete and return the 
survey. 
 
The survey was conducted in two batches using mailing lists purchased from 
reputable private companies that acquired the names and addresses from multiple 
sources, including telephone directories, credit card records, courthouse records, and 
other public sources. The first mailing of 1,000 surveys was sent in November, 2001 
with a second mailing of 2,000 surveys following in May, 2002. A total of 586 
surveys were returned yielding 567 usable responses, 279 for the brand model and 
288 for the certification model. After accounting for the 466 inaccurate addresses, 
the net response rate was 22.4%.  
 
Sample statistics for the survey respondents and the U.S. population are presented 
in table 1. Because surveys were only sent to individuals who were at least 18 years 
of age, we would expect some differences between the survey sample and the U.S. 
population. As expected, the median age of respondents in our sample was higher 
than that of the U.S. population. Participants in our survey were also more highly 
educated as compared to the U.S. population. However, there was roughly the same 
percentage of women in our sample as in the nation as a whole.  
 
Table 1: Sociodemographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents and U.S. 
Population 
Characteristic  Survey Sample (N=567)  U.S. Population* 
Gender (% female)      53.3      51.2 
Median  Age  (years)     49.6     35.7 
Completed High School (%)      98.1      82.1 
Ethnicity (%)**         
•  African-American      4.4      
•  Anglo-American     73.2   
•  Asian     5.7   
•  Hispanic     3.8   
•  Other     13.0   
*U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001. 




Comparisons of sample statistics for respondents to both surveys were made to 
determine whether there were any statistically significant differences in 
sociodemographic characteristics between the two samples. The characteristics of 
the two samples were compared with respect to age, gender, percentage who 
completed high school, and percentage of Anglo-Americans. No statistically 
significant differences were found at the 10% probability level. 
 
 G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  10
Results 
 
The results of the conjoint analysis experiments for the brand and certification 
models were analyzed using the SAS TRANSREG procedure (SAS Institute, Inc.). 
Main effects ANOVA models were estimated based on equations (3) and (4), 
respectively. Eight observations were recorded for each respondent allowing the 
estimation of a preference function for each of the 567 respondents, 279 for the 
brand model and 288 for the certification model. The results of the analysis for the 
brand and certification models are presented in tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
 
To assess the goodness of fit for the brand and certification models, R2 statistics 
were calculated. An average R2 was calculated for each model by averaging the R2 
statistics for each of the 279 estimated equations for the brand model and the 288 
equations for the certification model. Similarly, average adjusted R2 statistics were 
calculated. Both models exhibited a reasonably good fit with an R2 of 0.84 for the 





One way to measure and compare the relative impact of each of the variables on an 
individual’s preference function is to calculate relative factor importance scores2. 
The scores represent the variation in the preference rating for one variable relative 
to the variation in the preference rating over all variables. For each characteristic, 
the variation in the preference rating is calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between the preference ratings of the most preferred and least preferred 
options. For binary variables this is simply the absolute value of the coefficient for  
  









Intercept     9.45     1.99     - 
BRAND     1.65     0.40     29.36% 
PRICE     -7.78     3.97     27.67% 
TECHNOLOGY     -2.42     0.40     42.97% 
Average R2     0.84     
Average R ¯2     0.72     
Note: Sample size = 279. 
 
                                                           
2 It should be noted that a limitation of using relative factor importance scores is that these measures may be 
influenced by the choice of attribute levels.  This is particularly true for factors such as price, where the levels used 
are largely subject to the discretion of the research. G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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Intercept     8.42     2.17     - 
CERTIFICATION     2.70     0.43     44.80% 
PRICE     -6.12     4.33     20.45% 
TECHNOLOGY     -2.09     0.43     34.75% 
Average R2     0.84     
Average R ¯2     0.73     
Note: Sample size = 288. 
 
 
the variable. For continuous variables, the variation in the preference rating is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the most preferred and 
least preferred attribute levels times the estimated coefficient for the variable. For 
example, for the aggregate preference functions in table 2, the variation in the 
PRICE variable is calculated as the absolute value of -0.2 (the difference between 
the least preferred option of $0.39 and the most preferred option of $0.59) 
multiplied times the coefficient on the price variable (-7.78), or 1.56. The variation 
in the BRAND and TECHNOLOGY variables is 1.65 and 2.42, respectively, and the 
sum of the variations for all variables is 5.63. Thus the relative factor importance 
score for the PRICE is 27.7% (1.56 divided by 5.63). 
 
The results of both the brand and certification models indicate that there is a fairly 
strong penalty associated with the use of GMO technology. The coefficients on the 
TECHNOLOGY variables are -2.42 and -2.09 for the brand and certification models, 
yielding relative factor importance scores of 42.97% and 34.75%, respectively. The 
results of the brand model suggest that, in the aggregate, the premium associated 
with marketing bananas under a brand (1.65) was not sufficient to offset the GMO 
technology penalty of -2.42. On the other hand, the aggregate certification model 
results indicate that government certification may be an effective way of ensuring 
consumers that GMO technology is safe. The certification premium of 2.70 was more 
than adequate to offset the GMO technology penalty of -2.09. 
 
Another way to represent the value of the various alternatives is by calculating the 
monetary value of each alternative. This is accomplished by dividing the coefficient 
on each alternative by the price coefficient, which represents the value of a $1.00 
increase in the price per pound of bananas. Thus, the brand model shows that 
consumers impose a penalty for GMO technology of $0.34 per pound (-2.09 divided 
by -6.12). Similarly, a penalty of $0.31 (-2.42 divided by -6.78) is calculated for the 
certification model. Considering the results of both models, our research indicates 
that consumers are willing to pay slightly more that $0.30 per pound to avoid GMO 
technology in bananas.  G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  12
 
The GMO penalties may be compared with the premiums for brand or government 
certification.  The brand and certification premiums are calculated as $0.21 (1.65 
divided by –7.78) and $0.44 (2.70 divided by –6.12), respectively.  Again, we see that 
only the certification premium is sufficient to offset the GMO technology penalty. 
 
Individual Level Results 
 
The aggregate results provide useful information regarding the general consumer 
preferences for the various attributes. However, aggregate results mask important 
information regarding the number of respondents with specific preferences and the 
strength of these preferences. Because multiple observations were recorded for each 
respondent, it is possible to evaluate each respondent’s preference function. This is 
one of the primary advantages of using the type of CA analysis employed in this 
study. 
 
An examination of the individual preference functions indicates that the great 
majority of consumers in both experiments exhibited a preference for avoiding GMO 
technology. In the brand experiment, 81% (225 of the 279 respondents) indicated 
that the use of GMO technology reduced their preference for the product. In the 
certification experiment, a similarly high percentage of respondents, 78% (226 of 
the 288 respondents), had a negative perception of GMO technology. 
  
By comparing the brand and certification premiums with the GMO penalty for 
every respondent who had a negative perception of GMO technology for both 
models, it is possible to determine the effectiveness of the branding and certification 
methods in addressing consumers’ reservations regarding GMOs. In the brand 
model, the brand premium was at least as great as the GMO penalty for 36.44% of 
the respondents (82 out of 225). This suggests that the use of a familiar brand is 
sufficient to assuage the fears associated with GM food products for about a third of 
the sample. For the certification model, the analysis suggests that for a majority of 
the respondents (123 out of 226, or 54.45%) government certification was sufficient 
to offset the negative perceptions associated with the GM product. 
 
Factors Affecting Brand and Certification Preferences 
 
In order to explore the factors associated with strong brand and certification 
preferences, a qualitative choice model was specified. Respondents were classified 
based on the relative factor importance scores for either the brand or certification 
variables, depending on whether they were sent the brand or certification survey. A 
respondent was considered to have a strong brand preference if the relative factor 
importance score for the brand attribute was as least as great as the combined 
relative factor importance scores for the price and technology attributes. Likewise, a 
respondent was categorized as having a strong certification preference if the  G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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Table 4: Description of Variables for Logit Model of Factors Affecting Consumer 
Preferences for Brands and Government Certification 
Variable Name  Description 
Dependent Variables:   
  STRONGBRAND  1  if strong brand preference 
0  if weak brand preference 
 
 STRONGCERT  1  if strong government certification preference 
0  if weak government certification preference 
 
Independent Variables:   
  GENDER 1  if  female 
0  if male 
 
  AGE Years 
 
  WHITE 1  if  Anglo-American 
0  otherwise  
 
  CHILDHOME  1  if child 12 or younger lives in household 
0  otherwise 
 
 EDUCATION  Highest level of education completed: 
1  if elementary school 
2  if some high school 
3  if high school 
4  if some college 
5 if  college 
6  if grad school 
 
  POPULATION  Population of town in millions of people 
 
  PRIMEGROCERY   1  if household’s primary grocery shopper 
0  otherwise 
 
  GMOKNOWLEDGE  Knowledge of biotechnology 




5  if a lot 
 
 RISKAVERSE  *  Level of risk aversion 




5  if very high 
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 TRUSTFIRMS  Trust in large companies 




9  if strongly agree 
 
 TRUSTGOVT  Belief that government keeps companies in check 




9  if strongly agree 
 
 FIRSTCOMPUTER  One of first of peers to own a computer 




9  if strongly agree 
*The RISKAVERSE variable is a composite index based on the answer to three questions. 
Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing strong disagreement and 5 
representing strong agreement with the following statements: 1) I don’t like to take chances if I 
don’t have to; 2) I like to experiment with new ways of doing things; and 3) I am cautious in trying 
new/different products. In calculating the index, the responses to the second question were inverted 
so that a high number corresponded to a high level of risk aversion to be consistent with the scale 
used for questions one and three. The answers to all three questions were then averaged for each 
respondent to create the RISKAVERSE variable. 
 
 
relative factor importance score for certification was at least as great as the 
combined scores for the price and technology attributes. 
 
Two logistic regression models were estimated, one for strong brand preference and 
another for strong certification preference. Assuming a logistic distribution, the 
binomial logit models were defined as: 
   
,
) β exp( 1
) β exp(





= = PREFERENCE  
,
) β exp( 1
1
) 0 ( P
x′ +
= = PREFERENCE  
 
 
such that PREFERENCE represents either strong brand preference 
(STRONGBRAND) or strong certification preference (STRONGCERT), both as 
defined above, and x is the vector of explanatory variables including 
sociodemographic, knowledge, and opinion variables, as defined in Table 4.  
 G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  15
Table 5: Logit Models of Strong Brand and Strong Government Certification 
Preference 









CONSTANT      0.1829  
 (0.8855) 
  —    -0.4449 
 (0.6619) 
— 
GENDER   -0.0377 
  (0.9177)     
 -0.0036    -0.0954 
 (0.7339) 
 -0.0047 
AGE   -0.0105   
  (0.3103)    
 -0.0016    -0.0133 
 (0.1334) 
 -0.0032 
WHITE   -0.8689 
 (0.0088)** 
 -0.0807    0.3872 
 (0.1906) 
 0.0220 
CHILDHOME   -0.7053 
  (0.1069)     
 -0.0636    -0.2898 
 (0.3552) 
 -0.0161 
EDUCATION    -0.4804 
 (0.0012)** 
 -0.0734    -0.1657 
 (0.1510) 
 -0.0397 
POPULATION   -0.0861 
  (0.6570)     
 -0.0132    -0.0155 
 (0.9065) 
 -0.0037 
PRIMEGROCERY   -0.5329 
  (0.1842)    
 -0.0507    0.0984 
 (0.7467) 
 0.0050 
GMOKNOWLEDGE   -0.1508 
 (0.4152)   
 -0.0230    -0.1386 
 (0.3706) 
 -0.0332 
RISKAVERSE   0.5517 
 (0.0075)**   
 0.0843    0.2643 
 (0.0881)* 
 0.0633 
TRUSTFIRMS    0.1083 
  (0.2436)   
 0.0166      -0.0539 
 (0.4518) 
 -0.0129 
TRUSTGOVT   -0.0015 
  (0.9877)      
 -0.0002    0.2835** 
 (0.0001) 
 0.0686 
FIRSTCOMPUTER   0.0979 
  (0.1138)    
 0.0150   -0.0592 
 (0.2364) 
 -0.0142 
-2 Log Likelihood    258.1    360.2 
χ2   39.9**        28.9** 
Correct Predictions    75.1%         68.0% 




The analysis was performed using the SAS LOGISTIC procedure (SAS Institute, 
Inc.). Both models represent a reasonably good fit as indicated by the summary 
statistics in table 5. The brand and certification models correctly predicted 68.0% 
and 75.1% of the responses, respectively. 
 
The results of the brand model indicate that three variables were statistically 
significant. Those individuals who were most risk averse, the least educated, and 
non-white were most likely to have a strong brand preference. For the government 
certification model, only two variables were statistically significant. Individuals who G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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were most risk averse and those who placed the most trust in government were 
most likely to have a strong preference for government certification. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
Addressing consumer concerns for the safety of GM food products is an important 
issue for consumers, government, and food producers.  The results of this research 
provide insights into consumers’ attitudes regarding GMO food products and the 
way they are regulated and marketed.  One interesting result is the apparent 
paradox between the large number of respondents who had a negative perception of 
GMOs and the seeming lack of concern by the U.S. consuming public, particularly 
given the prevalence of food products containing GMOs. We do not believe that 
these findings are inconsistent. On the one hand, the tacit acceptance of GMOs by 
most U.S. consumers may reflect the routine purchase of food products that 
consumers believe are safe. These routine food purchases are made in the absence of 
specific information concerning the technology used to produce the products. On the 
other hand, respondents to our survey were given explicit information regarding the 
GMO content of the food product. It seems likely that such an explicit provision of 
information regarding the GMO content of a food could trigger a host of questions in 
consumers’ minds, including the issue of product safety. This has implications for 
whether GMO food products should be labeled. While information on the GMO 
content of foods may be of interest to consumers, providing this information may 
cause consumers to question the safety of the food. 
 
The primary objective of this research was to explore the effectiveness of branding 
and certification in addressing consumers’ fears regarding GMOs. The results of the 
analysis clearly indicate that government certification of a GMO product would be 
more effective than marketing the product under a well-known brand name.  This 
finding was confirmed by the analysis of both aggregate and individual results. 
 
In the aggregate case, the penalties associated with the use of GMO technology 
were compared to the premiums associated with the use of a familiar brand and 
government certification in two separate models. In the government certification 
model, the government certification premium was more than sufficient to 
compensate for the penalty associated with a GM food product. However, in the 
brand model, the strength of a familiar brand was insufficient to offset consumers’ 
fears of GMOs.  
 
While aggregate results are indicative of general consumer preferences, purchasing 
decisions are not made in the aggregate. It is revealing to examine the preferences 
of individual consumers to determine the effectiveness of certification and branding 
in mitigating consumer concerns for GMOs. Once again, government certification 
was found to be more effective than branding. For a majority of respondents (54%) 
government certification was an effective means of signaling the safety of the GM G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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food. Although the use of a familiar brand was less effective than government 
certification, a familiar brand was still sufficient to compensate for the negative 
impact of GMOs on consumer preferences for slightly over one-third of the sample 
(36%).  
 
The finding that government certification is the preferred option for signaling GMO 
safety in the U.S. is consistent with the findings of Christensen, who, in a study of 
Utah consumers, directly compared consumer trust in government, private firms, 
and special interest groups in ensuring the safety of beef products. Consumers 
overwhelming chose government as the most trusted organization.  
 
We speculate that our findings are due to the high level of confidence that most U.S. 
consumers have in the government agencies that are charged with protecting 
consumer health and safety. Agencies such as the FDA, USDA, and EPA do not 
have a financial stake in any particular product and enjoy a high level of consumer 
trust as protectors of public health and safety. On the other hand, companies are 
likely perceived as acting in their own best interest. They are primarily motivated 
by the pursuit of profit and may therefore be perceived as acting in the consumer 
interest only insofar as it satisfies their profit objective. 
 
A secondary objective of this research was to explore the factors that influenced 
consumers’ preferences for government certification and branding. The analysis 
indicated that those people who had the strongest preferences for certification and 
branding were also most averse to risk. This suggests that consumers may seek out 
mechanisms such as certification or branding as a way to mitigate the perceived 
risks associated with GMO food products. The results also hinted at the reason for 
respondents’ preferences for government certification. Those consumers who most 
preferred government certification also had the highest level of trust in the 
government. These results provide insight into the effective use of programs 
designed to assure consumers that the food they consume is safe. The most 
successful programs are likely to be those that most effectively address consumers’ 
concerns and are offered by entities in which consumers have a high level of trust. 
 
In conclusion, government certification was shown to be a more effective tool than 
branding for addressing consumers’ food safety concerns. However, both methods 
fell well short of assuring all consumers of the safety of GMOs. This indicates that a 
strategy that employs a single element, such as either branding or certification, 
may be inadequate to address the full range of consumers’ concerns. Assuring 
consumers that GMO food products are safe may require a multi-pronged strategy 
including elements such as additional research, education, certification, and 
branding. Our results do not preclude the use of private branding as a strategy to 
signal the safety of GM food products. Slightly more than a third of the consumers 
in this study exhibited preferences indicating that a familiar brand was an effective 
way to offset their apprehensions regarding GM foods. The use of a familiar brand G. Baker and M. Mazzocco / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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may be an effective strategy for signaling product safety when no good alternative 
exits, such as government or third party certification. Branding may be particularly 
effective when coupled with a beneficial GM trait such as enhanced nutrition, 
longer shelf life, or a distinctive flavor. However, government sponsored 
certification, whether voluntary or mandatory, would likely be a better alternative 
than marketing GMOs under a company brand name if the safety of GMO products 
becomes a major consumer issue. Such a strategy may also help protect a company’s 
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